













In this paper, we combine concepts from organizational economics to examine supply chain 
alliances formed to market branded beef products.  To illustrate application of the framework, we 
examine three different types of alliances.  We conclude that measuring costs associated with 
quality attributes have an important role in alliance structure.   
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Emerging technologies and marketing practices appear to be providing beef marketers with new 
opportunities to differentiate their beef products.  Many of the most important attributes to 
consumers of beef such as flavor, tenderness, nutrition, and safety are not apparent to consumers 
until the product is eaten.  Moreover, emerging consumer concerns, such as the humane 
treatment of farm animals and environmentally friendly production practices, are impossible to 
detect even after consumption.  This can lead to market failure that may prevent consumers and 
producers from engaging in what would otherwise be a mutually beneficial transaction.  The use 
of brand names and firm reputation to assure food product performance is one private solution to 
this market failure.   
 
To capture premiums associated with branded products, strategic alliances have proliferated to 
provide the needed quality standards.  Twenty-eight percent more cattle were marketed through 
alliances in 2005 compared to 2001.  Research efforts on vertical alliances are beginning to 
grow, and additional work is needed to understand their function and implications.       
 
Previous research has provided descriptions of branded beef alliances or applied a single 
theoretical paradigm to examine methods of coordinating supply chain alliances.  The variety of 
alliance structures found, suggest that alliances may serve a number of roles and may be 
explained by a number of different factors.  Consequently, a conceptual framework that 
combines different theoretical paradigms appears warranted.   
   2 
The major objective of this research is to evaluate the growing presence of U.S. beef strategic 
alliances formed to increase returns to supply chain participants by producing branded beef 
products.  What advantages do strategic alliances offer, and what factors account for the diversity 
of alliance structures? 
 
We begin with a discussion of beef quality and characteristics preferred by consumers.  Next, we 
provide an overview of current manufacturer or retail branded beef programs in existence in the 
United States, which continue to evolve.  This will illustrate how branded beef programs have 
developed with the goal of satisfying consumer preferences and increasing returns to 
participants.  We then conduct a more in depth case study analysis of three companies, one from 
each of the most common classes of strategic alliances: brand licensing programs, marketing 
alliances, and new-generation cooperatives.  For each, we examine program requirements, 
compensation methods, and coordinating arrangements that support the alliance (e.g., contracts, 
licensing agreements, certification).  We employ elements of the organizational economics 
literature, including transaction costs economics (TCE), agency theory, and resource-based 
theory to examine the role of alliances in each of our three cases.         
Consumer Preferences for Beef  
 
Between 1975 and 1999, demand for beef fell by 66 percent, and its share of meat consumption 
fell from 48 percent to 32 percent.  Along with increasingly health-conscious consumers, poor 
beef quality relative to other meats has also been suggested as a reason for the decline.  At the 
same time, evidence showed that consumers were willing to pay substantial premiums for 
improved beef quality.  
   3 
Flavor, juiciness, and tenderness characteristics combine to determine whether the consumer has 
a good or a bad eating experience.  Consumers consider tenderness the most important 
component of meat quality (Koohmarie et al). Because an estimated one in four steaks is rated as 
tough (National Beef Quality Audit 1992), improving tenderness in beef has become a major 
concern in the beef industry. A number of studies have shown that consumers are willing to pay 
a premium for more tender beef. Lusk et al, for instance, found that over half the participants in 
one study would be willing to pay $1.84 a pound more for “guaranteed tender” over “probably 
tough” ribeye steaks.  Loureiro and Umberger (2004) found that consumers were willing to pay a 
$1.14 per pound premium for guaranteed tender steaks.  
 
In addition to palatability, consumers are also interested in the healthfulness and safety of the 
meat products they consume. While marbling has been discussed as a desirable trait in terms of 
flavor and juiciness, many consumers find the increased fat content associated with marbling 
undesirable. Killinger et al (2004) found that most consumers in Chicago (86.7%) and San 
Francisco (67%) preferred steaks with low marbling when conducting a visual appraisal of beef 
products.  This study seems to suggest that consumers are likely to systematically select beef 
products that may be less palatable.   
 
The safety of the meat products is a prime concern to beef consumers. Many consumers, for 
instance, are concerned about the potential adverse health effects of growth hormones given to 
livestock. Lusk, et al (2003) show that US consumers were willing to pay large premiums for 
“hormone free” beef and beef produced using only genetically modified feeds.  Loureiro and 
Umberger (2004) found that consumers were willing to pay significant premiums for assurance   4 
that beef has been food safety inspected and that the product can be traced back to the farm of 
origin. 
 
Country of origin verification has gained interest in the US in recent years. A survey of 
consumers in Chicago and Denver by Umberger et al (2003) found that most consumers were 
willing to pay significant premiums for beef guaranteed to be “Born and Raised in the USA”. 
The consumers indicated a variety of reasons for their willingness to pay premiums for the 
guaranteed US product. Among the reasons cited was a desire to support US farmers and a belief 
that US beef was of higher quality.   
Background Information on Beef Strategic Alliances  
Vertical coordination refers to all of the ways that resources are transferred between between 
economic stages of production.  These include open, or spot, markets, contract production, 
strategic alliances, and vertical integration.  Trading on spot markets requires no commitments 
before the product is produced, and prices coordinate resource transfer.  Contract production 
involves commitments to sell a product prior to completing production at a predetermined 
formula price.  Vertical integration involves combining two or more stages under one firm, 
which administers resources across stages.   
 
Strategic alliances involve exchange relationships whereby firms share the risks and benefits of 
mutually defined objectives.  They allow transaction partners to maintain their independence, 
while controlling the flow of resources across stages.  Strategic alliances can be further 
delineated into formal and informal alliances (Brocklebank and Hobbs).  Formal alliances, also 
referred to as new generation cooperatives, typically require exchange partners to enter into   5 
contracts and make a financial investment.  They are typically producer owned with the primary 
goal of enhancing information flows to members, reducing production costs, and increasing 
profits.   
 
Informal alliances may or may not require use of a contract, and do not require an initial 
investment to participate.  There are two types of informal alliances; brand licensing and 
marketing alliances.  Brand licensing programs typically require that cattle meet certain genetic 
requirements specific to a particular breed, and involves a branded product that uses the breed as 
a proxy for quality.  They tend to be loosely coordinated with the only requirements being that 
participants are certified to sell beef under the program name and that the breed of cattle can be 
verified.  Marketing alliances are owned by operations that purchase finished cattle from 
cow/calf producers and/or feedlots through a grid pricing system and that are subject to specific 
program requirements.  Informal alliances rely more heavily on trust between alliance partners, 
as opposed to equity investments in new generation cooperatives that create incentives for long-
term relationships.  While considerable variation in organizational structure can exist within each 
classification, it provides a useful format for examining the factors influencing alliance 
formation (table 1).               
 
Beef Magazine’s Yellow Pages provides the most comprehensive public listing of industry 
alliances (Ishmael).  A comparison of annual surveys in 2005 versus 2001 reveals a slight decline 
in the total number listed, from 36 to 33.  However, the total number of cattle produced by 
alliances increased by 28 percent, from 1.99 million to 2.5 million.  There remains considerable 
variation across alliances in allowable carcass weights, while the range in premiums has grown    6 
Table 1. General defining characteristics of alliance types 
Type  Defining characteristics 
Brand licensing   •  Loose contract arrangements with certification being the 
only obligation. 
•  Must meet certain genetic requirements (Often breed 
based). 
•  Producers may choose to sell all or no cattle through the 
program.  
•  Generally, cattle sold on a yield or quality grid. 
•  Centered around a branded product that conveys quality 
standard to consumers. 
 
Marketing alliance (specialty 
product marketer) 
•  Similar to brand licensing, but different in structure. 
•  Production requirements specified. 
•  Yield-based grid. 
•  Further screening process (e.g., ultrasound, quality-based 
grid). 
•  Value added through brand identification while creating a 
specialty niche. 
 
New generation cooperatives  •  Producer buys or leases stock shares in company. 
•  Producer rights and obligations specified (e.g., number of 
head per share to be sold through cooperative). 
•  Combined grid based on yield and quality grades. 
•  Dividend or bonus payments to producers. 
•  Cooperative-marketed brand. 
Sources:  Anton; Brocklebank and Hobbs. 
from $10-$60 per head in 2001 to $5-$109 per head in 2005.  A greater number of alliances 
required specific management practices in addition to carcass specifications.  In 2005, 92 percent 
required source verification, weaning, preconditioning, or natural beef management practices 
(i.e., typically prohibit use of antibiotics and growth hormones), compared to 67 percent in 2001.  
Preconditioning, is a vaccination, nutrition, and management program designed to prepare young 
cattle for the stresses associated with weaning and shipment to a backgrounding yard or feedlot.  
Certain buyers are willing to pay premiums for preconditioned calves because of reduced 
sickness, improved performance, and enhanced beef product quality.  One program, Western 
Grasslands Beef, required “Born & Raised in the USA” certification.         7 
Theoretical Framework for Alliance Formation and Alliance Types  
The principle theoretical approach for understanding when alliances form is transaction cost 
economics (TCE) (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven).  TCE views vertical coordination 
arrangements (e.g., contracts, alliances, vertical integration) mainly as a means of reducing 
transaction costs, which include costs of drafting, negotiating, safeguarding an agreement, and 
haggling and monitoring costs after the agreement has been made.  One source of transaction 
costs are those associated with safeguarding investments in assets specific to the transaction (i.e., 
relationship-specific assets).  Investments in relationship-specific assets, such as particular 
genetics, limit producer options for selling cattle elsewhere.  Hence, they become subject to 
opportunistic behavior by the processor because the assets have considerably less value in their 
next-best use.  This leads to transaction costs associated with buyer actions as they seek 
concessions from sellers, and sellers act to safeguard against such opportunistic behavior.  
Similarly, brand name capital may be considered an intangible asset that may leave the owner 
susceptible to opportunistic behavior by input providers if specific inputs are tied to the brand.  
With investments in relationship-specific assets, parties will enter into arrangements to protect 
against opportunistic behavior.   
 
Another class of transaction costs is measurement, or information, costs.
2 These include costs of 
searching for information about buyers or sellers in the market, inspecting goods prior to 
purchase, and assigning a price.  Measuring costs may be especially significant when 
transactions are characterized by asymmetric information, where one party has an information 
advantage over the other party.  For example, the producer may have more information than the 
                                                 
2As defined by Barzel, “measurement is the quantification of information.”   8 
processor about a difficult-to-measure quality attribute, such as food safety practices and animal 
welfare standards.  Likewise, the processor has more information regarding its own contributions 
to food safety, environmental preservation, and animal welfare practices that may be associated 
with a branded product.  This suggests that the method of vertical coordination may be 
influenced by efforts to reduce measuring costs that are associated with assuring a closer 
correspondence between product value and price, or actions and rewards (Barzel, 1982).        
 
Another branch of the industrial organization literature, agency theory, attempts to determine the 
specific compensation features that align incentives of the principal (alliance manager) and agent 
(alliance member), where the principal is the controlling authority and the agent acts for the 
principal (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Broadly speaking, cooperative behavior between the principal and 
agent is viewed as a contracting problem between self-interested individuals with different goals 
and risk preferences. 
 
In cases of asymmetric information about the quality of beef, where the packer is unaware of 
actions taken by the producer, two options are available to limit moral hazard (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
First, producers may be rewarded based, at least partially, on outcomes of their behavior 
(outcome-oriented).  Second, the processor may invest in information about producer behavior, 
such as provisions for third party monitoring of sellers, documents to justify activities performed, 
and other means of increasing information disclosure (behavior-oriented).   
 
The optimal performance evaluation strategy (behavior-oriented versus outcome-oriented) will 
depend on the ability to measure quality outcomes and related inputs.  When quality outcomes   9 
are difficult to measure or difficult to measure in a reasonable amount of time, behavior-oriented 
contracts will become more attractive.  Behavior-oriented contracts are also more likely if 
producer activities can be easily defined and evaluated, which makes it easier to specify 
appropriate producer behavior in advance.  In this case, the production process is referred to as 
highly task programmable (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
 
Given the distinguishing features of each method of vertical coordination, their use can be 
matched to characteristics of the transaction in a discriminating way (table 2).  The ultimate 
choice of vertical coordination method will depend on a combination of these characteristics.  
Investments in specific assets leave firms vulnerable to opportunistic behavior if selling on the 
spot market.  As asset specificity increases, within a specific range, alliances offering greater 
safeguards are expected, ceteris paribus.  Brand licensing offers some safeguards for low levels 
of asset specificity compared to spot markets via loose contractual arrangements and 
specification of required actions.  As assets become more specific, marketing alliances provide 
added protections through more specific production requirements and screening processes.  For 
highly specific assets, new generation cooperatives safeguard investments by requiring equity 
investments in the program that encourage long-term relationships.  Formal contract 
requirements also provide protections by delineating producer rights and obligations.      
 
In cases of information asymmetry regarding beef quality attributes, new generation cooperatives 
provide advantages over less formal alliance forms through detailed program requirements and 
monitoring efforts.  Security features to mitigate moral hazard may also be employed, such as 
formal contracts and provisions for third party monitoring to ensure compliance.  Because    10 
Table 2.  Relationship between organizational arrangements and transaction characteristics. 
  Organizational forms 










Asset specificity  None  Low  Intermediate  High  High 
Information asymmetry  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Quality variability  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Source:  Adapted from Brocklebank and Hobbs. 
members are participants and can readily monitor program compliance, there is also more 
transparency in production activities (Brocklebank and Hobbs).  As part owners and 
beneficiaries of its success, incentives to refrain from nonperformance are enhanced.   
      
Given variability in the final beef quality attributes, the price received may not be easily 
predicted (Brocklebank and Hobbs).  The price received by a seller is uncertain when tenderness 
and/or leanness attributes are provided and grid-based pricing systems are used.  Even if a grid 
pricing system is implemented, the price paid to cow-calf producers and cattle feeders will not be 
known until after final processing is complete.  Sellers will incur measuring costs to reduce price 
uncertainty associated with incomplete information on quality.  As price uncertainty increases, it 
is expected that methods of vertical coordination will be entered to reduce the uncertainty and 
associated transaction costs.  Joining an alliance can reduce these costs by increasing cow-calf 
operators and feedlots access to information and their ability to access markets with higher 
prices.  In addition, by entering an alliance, producer monitoring costs to ensure accurate grading 
may be reduced.  This is because processors have an incentive to maintain a positive relationship 
with producers given the benefits it receives from a stable supply of high quality cattle 
(Brocklebank and Hobbs).             
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Finally, the resource-based view suggests that firms will combine resources in an alliance when 
returns from the alliance exceed returns from their separately held resource portfolios.  To the 
extent that TCE fails to capture the strategic factors that lead firms to enter strategic alliances, 
the resource-based view may provide a more enlightened explanation of alliance formation 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven).  Firms in vulnerable strategic positions are more likely to 
cooperate with other firms through the formation of strategic alliances.  Several factors affect the 
vulnerability of a firm’s strategic position.  First, in markets with a large number of competitors, 
profits are stressed and survival is threatened.  Strategic alliances can improve a firm’s strategic 
position by providing resources that enable them to share risks and costs, and ensure more even 
and predictable resource flows.  They can also help give the firm credibility by providing 
visibility and signaling a higher status, which helps to distinguish firms in crowded markets.  
 
Second, market stage affects strategic position.  Emergent-stage markets are small, new, and 
characterized by lack of product clarity.  Alliances can improve strategic position in emergent 
markets by providing financial resources to enable cost and risk-sharing with other firms, and by 
legitimizing a new market.   
 
Third, strategic position is affected by firm strategy, including degree of innovation.  An alliance 
partner can improve the strategic position of a firm with a pioneering strategy by enabling firms 
to concentrate resources on developing a highly innovative strategy, while leveraging the 
resources of the partner in other functions.  Firms with less innovative strategies are less likely to 
need alliances because the time and resources needed are generally less substantial and more 




In this section we shed light on the operation and structure of supply chain alliances that satisfy 
consumer preferences for branded beef products and reduce dependence on commodity 
production.  How do quality measuring costs, incentive alignment goals, relationship-specific 
investments, and strategic positioning affect alliance formation and structure?   
 
Given the lack of detailed aggregate data, and the potential for generating more in depth 
information on alliance structure and operations, we implement case study methods.
4  In 
particular, we choose one company from each type of alliance structure; Certified Angus Beef 
(brand licensing), Nolan Ryan’s Tender Aged Beef (marketing alliance), and Ranchers 
Renaissance (new generation cooperative).   
 
The Certified Angus Beef (CAB) brand began in 1978 and is the oldest and largest brand, 
growing by about 30 percent per year.  It operates as a division of the American Angus 
Association, which is composed of Angus breeders.  The goal of the program is to produce high 
quality, tender, and flavorful beef.  Standard USDA grades are used to price CAB beef, and 
USDA inspectors certify the program.  Premiums based on the choice/select grade, plus a 
premium (Ishmael).  Cattle must be at least 51 percent black-hided, along with 8 further carcass 
specifications.  The CAB program does not own cattle or beef at any stage of production or 
                                                 
3Information on the Certified Angus Beef program and Ranchers Renaissance was obtained from 
Brocklebank and Hobbs.  We thank Charlie Bradbury for input on the Nolan Ryan program.  
4Alliances can be more broadly classified as a “hybrid” arrangement that lies between spot 
markets and vertical integration in incentive intensity, adaptability, and bureaucratic costs 
(Masten).  Masten concludes that given the diversity of hybrid forms that exist, factors that lead 
to their adoption and design are also diverse and, therefore, should be analyzed on a case-by-case   13 
processing.  The program sells licenses to processors, distributors, retailers, and restaurants to 
harvest fabricate, and sell CAB beef.   
 
The main production requirements relate to breed, which is visible during the farm-feedlot 
production process and initial stages of processing.  There are no long-term commitments on the 
part of cow-calf producers and feedlots, outside of producing cattle with the required breed and 
carcass quality characteristics.  Program requirements are broad enough that a large supply of 
cattle is more readily available without formal procurement arrangements.  Entry into CAB is 
easier than programs with more stringent production and quality requirements.  This suggests 
greater variance in the quality of cattle in the program compared to other branding programs.   
 
Nolan Ryan All Natural Tender Aged Beef was developed by Beefmaster Cattleman, L.P. The 
company began in 2001, and is a limited partnership with investors including cattle producers, 
one of which is spokesperson Nolan Ryan.  The company began with the goal of creating a 
branded beef marketing company that would promote Brahman influence cattle.  The product 
developed to meet those needs was Nolan Ryan All Natural Tender Aged Beef, which carries a 
product satisfaction guarantee.  Nolan Ryan Beef products are from Texas cattle producers and 
available only through contracted feed yards.  Contract requirements for licensed feed yards 
include added vitamin E to improve meat quality, and no growth hormones or antibiotics.  There 
are also mandated levels of electronic stimulation that are required for accepted carcasses, which 
have been proven to increase tenderness.  Nolan Ryan beef carcasses are selected using the 
“Smart Machine Vision Beef Cam,” which uses a scanning technology to identify carcasses that 
                                                                                                                                                             
basis.  If so, this would suggest a more prominent role for case study methodology in the analysis   14 
contain tender characteristics, while also meeting other standards set by the program.  Other 
product characteristics include limits to Yield grade 1 and 2, and carcasses weight specifications.  
Nolan Ryan quality restrictions create acceptance levels that range from 10 to 40 percent, which 
creates definite variation in weekly supply.  Another characteristic of Nolan Ryan Beef is that 
ownership is maintained to ensure correct aging, and products are sold to retailers after a 
minimum of 14 days. The product also includes third party certification from USDA, which is 
not the case for by all marketing alliances.   
 
Ranchers Renaissance is a new generation cooperative owned by ranchers.  The program has 
grown by 30 percent from 2001 to 2003, and involves partnerships between ranchers, feeders, a 
processor (Excel), and retailers.  The program goal is to better understand consumers, lower 
costs, share information, improve quality, and share added value created by the program.  The 
cooperative does not own an exclusive brand name label, but products are sold under several 
brand labels including Harris Teeter Rancher, Sobey’s Select, and Safeway’s Angus Ranchers 
Reserve.  The branded products guarantee consistency, tenderness, and flavor.  There are 23 
quality control points verifying genetics, source, production, and processing procedures.  Feed 
programs have been implemented to provide consumers with a consistently tender product.  
Third party verification is used to monitor program compliance and ear tags are used to collect 
data that is shared with all stages of the vertical chain, but USDA does not certify the program.     
 
To produce cattle under the program, membership fees are required which depend on the number 
of cattle marketed.  High volume members pay a one-time entry fee that is higher than that 
                                                                                                                                                             
of supply chain alliances. 
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required for members marketing lower volumes.  New members are screened to ensure that their 
operations will fit the program and that they are willing to provide a long-term commitment.  
Their operations are also audited by a third party to ensure compliance with program standards 
and regulations.  Annual inspections of operations of ranchers, feedlots, and packers are also 
conducted.      
 
Ranchers are required to market a minimum number of cattle in the program based on a rolling 
3-year average of past commitments.  Feedlots must guarantee feeding space for a certain 
number of Ranchers Renaissance cattle, and pay an initial entry fee similar to cow-calf 
producers.  Contracts between feedlots and Excel ensure a stable supply of cattle for processing. 
A grid-pricing system is used to reward supply chain partners, with premiums based on the 
quality of the end product.  
 
Table 3 summarizes our perception of transaction characteristics associated with each of the 
alliances.  A brand licensing program is sufficient to coordinate the production of CAB beef.  A 
small degree of asset specificity likely exists through investments in particular genetics and 
investments in brand name capital.  Studies have shown that consumers would be willing to pay 
an average premium of $2.33/lb for CAB beef compared to generic beef, which translates into 
fed cattle premiums of $2-5 per cwt.  The branded program should not have problems finding 
adequate supplies for its brand, given the broad nature of program requirements.  Information 
asymmetry does not exist because the breed requirements are readily visible, and so easily 
measured.  The “Angus” name serves as a proxy for quality in the mind of consumers, which 
allows for a program with flexible input requirements and a less formal alliance.  Price    16 
Table 3. Variables associated with transaction cost economics and agency theory explanations of 
alliances. 
  Transaction characteristics 




Low  None  Yes 
Nolan Ryan  Intermediate  Yes  Yes 
Ranchers 
Renaissance 
Low/intermediate  Yes  Yes 
uncertainty associated with variation in quality can be reduced compared to sales on the spot 
market by paying premiums through the identification of acceptable animals in a value-based 
marketing system.   
 
Some degree of asset specificity exists in the Nolan Ryan brand name, as cattle from the program 
go exclusively to the Nolan Ryan brand.  Information asymmetry related to several quality 
attributes are introduced along the supply chain.  Evidence suggests that beef from cattle with a 
high percentage Brahman parentage has lower marbling and is less tender on average than beef 
from other breeds.  Hence, additional steps are taken to differentiate and improve the quality of 
beef.  At the producer/processor interface, special feeding programs and absence of antibiotics 
and hormones are known to the producer, but not the packer.  At the processor/retailer interface, 
carcass stimulation and aging are characteristics known to the processor, but not the retailer.  
Contracts and third-party certification help to reduce measuring costs by disclosing information 
on program compliance.  Price uncertainty related to quality variability is introduced by the 
scanning technology used to evaluate beef tenderness.  Producers are uncertain as to how many 
of their cattle will be accepted into the program and the final price received.  
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In the Ranchers Renaissance alliance, low to intermediate levels of asset specificity likely exist 
through investments in brand name capital that guarantee quality, but are not tied to a single 
brand.  The initial entry fee required for program participation and screening of new members 
help to ensure producer commitment to the program.  Contract arrangements between feedlots 
and Excel may also safeguard against opportunistic behavior.  Information asymmetry exists in 
relation to quality attributes that are not easily measured, but are controlled by producers in the 
form of genetics, source, and feeding programs.  These quality attributes include consistency, 
tenderness, and flavor.  In this case, third party monitoring of program compliance and annual 
inspections of producers and packers help to protect against moral hazard.  Finally, a grid-pricing 
system helps to reduce price uncertainty and associated measuring, or search costs, by paying 
producers a premium for their differentiated cattle.        
 
The resource-based view provides a perspective on alliance formation based on market factors.  
The number of competitors is expected to influence firm decisions to enter into strategic 
alliances.  While all vertical stages of beef production have experienced increases in 
consolidation, most cow-calf production consists of a large number of small producers.  In 
addition, if one widens the relevant market to include all meats, chicken consumption surpassed 
beef consumption in the 1990s, and is now the most consumed protein in the U.S.  Under such 
conditions alliances can provide a means of sharing risks and costs, while benefiting from 
product differentiation.   
 
It may be argued that the branded beef market is an emerging market.  The 33 beef alliances 
listed in 2005, accounted for less than three percent of cattle inventory in the U.S.  This   18 
compares to only 6 alliances in 1993.  Alliance evolution to date has been difficult and slow 
(Ishmael).  Program operations may evolve over time through, perhaps, a trial and error process.  
In small, new, and uncertain markets, alliances can help firms to share the financial risks and 
resources as strategies are refined.     
 
Finally, the degree of innovation involved in each alliance is questionable.  However, one may 
argue that as the industry’s oldest brand, some degree of innovation was involved in the CAB 
strategy and alliance formation to provide resources and reduce risk.        
Conclusions  
This study contributes by analyzing the experiences of strategic alliances organized to capitalize 
on brand marketing opportunities, which also provides fruitful grounds for applying concepts 
from the evolving literature in organizational economics.  The industrialization of agriculture is 
having a significant effect on how food is produced and distributed, and requires agribusinesses 
to make key strategic marketing decisions to survive and evolve accordingly.  New methods of 
vertical coordination (e.g., contracts, strategic alliances) may serve an important role in assuring 
the economic viability of farms and other agribusinesses.  Branded beef alliances may also give 
smaller producers a viable means of competing.     
 
Insight into how new coordinating arrangements facilitate value-added product offerings is 
important for developing policies that build sustainable businesses in a global marketplace.     
In this paper, we describe and illustrate the application of a theoretical framework for examining 
alliance formation and alliance structure.  While the project remains a work in progress, 
preliminary conclusions suggest that reducing measuring costs associated with beef quality   19 
attributes play an important role in beef supply chain alliances.  This finding is consistent with 
Masten, who finds measurement costs to be more pertinent to the design of intermediate forms of 
vertical coordination, such as alliances, compared to relationship-specific investments.  In 
addition to measuring costs, strategic positioning may also play a role in alliance formation as 
programs evolve in uncertain market environments.  Future work will extend the current analysis 
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